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Wenhold: The First Fort of San Marcos de Apalache

THE FIRST FORT OF SAN MARCOS DE APALACHE
by LUCY L. WENHOLD
On the Gulf coast of southcentral Florida, where the St.
Marks River flowing from further upstate meets the longer,
shallower, eastward flowing Wakulla, the union of their waters
forms a wide, deep, river-mouth harbor for any sea-going vessels
that can pass the bar six miles further down at the entrance
to the bay of Apalache. Where the two rivers come together
there is a narrow headland that rises above the height of the
tide and thrusts as it were a pointing finger toward the open
sea. Today it is only a part of the harbor’s shoreline, grown
up with tall trees and thick bushes that hide the almost obliterated outlines of earthworks. On this headland, in the year
1680, Spaniards built the first Fort of San Marcos de Apalache.
At the time of its building that fort was already years overdue. Not so many years earlier only Indian pirogues and occasional small trading vessels from Havana or Vera Cruz moved
on the river-mouth harbor, but before the middle of the seventeenth century pirate raiders were beginning to make the place
a port of call. Taking the word in its most restricted sense they
could scarcely be called raiders there, for the reason that in
Apalache there was little to raid, but the harbor was good for
careening their ships, and meanwhile they traded with the
Indians who had no scruples about such business, and went
out well provisioned for their next foray. These things were
known in St. Augustine with ever-increasing uneasiness. Apalache was the granary of Spanish Florida and without what
its fertility produced the perennial near-starvation of the presidio would have been starvation indeed. Before the middle
of the century the colonial government had begun to keep
a lieutenant and a few enlisted men in the province, partly to
see that legitimate trading was done on a basis fair to the
301
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Indians, partly for the protection of the Franciscan missionaries
whose lives were threatened from time to time by unconverted
Indians or by treacherous natives in their own mission stations.
The missionaries were not grateful for that protection. On
the contrary they protested constantly against the presence of
soldiers in Apalache where (they said) the example of such
ungodly lives corrupted the weak moral sense of the Indians.
In the twenty-five or more years during which the fortifying
of Apalache repeatedly came before the Council for the Indies
the opposition of the Franciscan friars added considerably to
the difficulties the Council - a body of sincere and hard-working
men if ever there was one - met in its efforts to solve the problem. In the year 1660 it collected all the information it had
on the matter and presented to the Crown a long and full
consulta which arrived at the following conclusion:
The information the Council has is, it believes, reliable. But it has observed that the governors of Florida,
past and present, encourage military occupation for their
own advantage. . . as is evidenced by the offer of this
governor to construct the fortification without cost to
the royal treasury. For that reason, as well as because
none of the members of the Council has seen the harbor
and it appears that they cannot vote decisively nor propose to Your Majesty that the fortifying be done, it seems
advisable for the present that information be asked of
the Viceroy of New Spain and the Governor of Havana
as to the advantages or disadvantages which may attend
the constructing or failure to construct this fortification;
that there be made a plan of the harbor and of the proposed fortification, with the cost and the measures to be
taken for meeting it, the expenditure to be regulated with
the economy demanded by the present condition of things
and the state of stringency in which the national treasury
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now is; that there be sent from Mexico or from Havana
a practical person experienced in such matters to investigate and inform himself individually concerning the whole
affair in order that he may report to Your Majesty through
this Council what may appear to him most advisable. 1
These suggestions were carried out through a period of five
or more years with results that represented some very neat
shifting of responsibility. The Viceroy of Mexico - at that time
the Marquis of Mancera - received the royal command with
respect but regretted that he had in the city of Mexico no one
at all who was qualified to undertake the investigation of the
proposed fortification of Apalache. Undoubtedly the uppermost consideration in the viceregal mind was: Who would pay
for all this? The viceroys of New Spain were great lords and
peers of the Spanish realm and for the most part far above
petty pilfering, but their tenure of office was usually short, and
if they must return to Spain, where the national olla was chronically empty, with nothing to show for their years in the opulent
Indies, why, it would be just too bad. Florida, whose very
existence depended on regular remittances from Mexico, was
the chief thorn in the viceregal flesh. Doubtless the home
government, when it made Florida a dependent of New Spain,
did not foresee that this the youngest of its colonies would
never be self-supporting, but must the viceroyalty be eternally
responsible for that mistake? As a rule the Florida subsidy
was paid when the viceroy could not get out of paying it.
1. The passage quoted is taken from ms. 59-1-26 num. 10 Archives of
the Indies. The translation is mine. ‘“This governor” referred to was
Alonso Aranguez y Cotes (some commentators spell the name Cortes
but he himself spelled it without the r) who died shortly afterward in
office, apparently of malnutrition. The offer to build the fort without
expense to the royal treasury seems to have been misunderstood by
the Council. In view of the circumstances it is safe to conclude that
it was motivated not by any advantage which would accrue to the
governor, but rather by a sincere realization of danger to the province
and the certainty that if building of the fort must await funds from
Spain it would never be built at all.

Published by STARS, 1955

3

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 34 [1955], No. 4, Art. 3
304

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

Otherwise it was paid on the principle of leaving it for the
next viceroy to pay. Meanwhile St. Augustine starved. Now
the viceroy gathered up this new problem and dropped it into
the lap of the governor of Havana 2 with the comment that as
Havana was nearer to Apalache than was the city of Mexico
its governor doubtless had all the answers including a qualified
investigator. Promptly the governor wrote back that he had
no investigator either. There had been a well qualified man
in Havana some years previously, but he had now removed to
Vera Cruz. Vera Cruz! That put the whole matter back into
the Viceroy’s hands precisely where the governor wanted it
to be. However (he wrote to the Crown) the proper person
to conduct this investigation was the governor of Florida, as
the harbor of Apalache was distant from St. Augustine only
eighty leagues by land, and there were in the province a
captain and some soldiers and missionary priests who maintained the Indians in the Holy Faith.
Here the matter rested. These were the years when Florida
was increasingly threatened by the ambitions of the English,
on the north by the Carolinians, on the south by Jamaica where
the English, only recently in possession, were turning covetous
eyes upon the fertility of Apalache. 3 In 1668 English pirates
raided and sacked St. Augustine. Successive governors had
long warned Council and Crown of precisely that danger, but
fruitlessly. Now however, shocked by the evident ease with
which the presidio had been taken, the home government took
action and the long task of building St. Augustine’s castillo of
stone was begun. The exchequer of Mexico bore the financial
burden of that construction, commands from home being too
positive to be disregarded, and thus, while every nerve was
strained to close to invasion Florida’s vulnerable front door,
2. Francisco de Avila Orejon Gaston.
3. So, at least, the rumor ran among the Spanish refugees from Jamaica.
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Apalache, its equally vulnerable back door, was left open year
after year.
In the year 1677 Governor don Pablo Hita Salazar took
a day from the strenuous duty of building the castillo to check
through the papers turned over to him by his gubernatorial
predecessor. Among these he found a cedula addressed to his
predecessor’s predecessor. 4 and dated in Madrid eleven years
before. Examination showed this to be the Crown’s action on
the Governor of Havana’s suggestion that an investigation into
the matter of fortifying Apalache be referred to the Governor
of Florida within whose jurisdiction Apalache lay. The referring had been done; the investigation had never been made.
Hita Salazar read the cedula with interest, and having read it
he wrote to the Crown urging the immediate fortification of
Apalache, explaining that he is sending a description of the
harbor and a plan 5 of the fortification which, he says, he is
even then beginning to construct, using native labor for the
time being until the Crown may provide funds for its proper
completion.
Governor Hita Salazar was an old man and far from wel1,
and the experiences he had already had in Florida would have
discouraged the most optimistic, but he lacked neither initiative nor energy. While he awaited a final answer from the
Crown he had timbers cut and Indian labor recruited. He
wrote out in detail building instructions and even prepared a
manual giving instructions as to how the fort was to be gar4. Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega.
5. This plan shows a square fort with salient bastions and thick wall and
without any details, interior or exterior. Its measurements are given
in varas and it must have been roughly 67 by 67 feet in area with a
maximum height of eighteen feet. The location of the fort is given
with relation to the two rivers whose names are given as they then
were: The Toscache and the Guacara. The distance from fort to
harbor mouth is given as six miles and the river depth at high tide
as at least nine feet. The plan is captioned: The fort it is possible to
build in the harbor of San Marcos, but it was not sent to the Crown
until 1680, after the fort was built.
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risoned and how it was to be defended in case of attack, all
very enthusiastic if a trifle incoherent here and there. Still the
Council hesitated, asked for more information: What would
be the result of opening the road to Mexico? What draught
of vessels could enter the harbor? Were the Christianized
natives of Apalache sufficient in number to form a settlement
there? But the Council as a whole, and consequently the
Crown, approved the proposed fortification and Hita Salazar
began to build it. There is a note of disillusionment in the brief
letter with which he sends the plan of the fort and other papers
concerning it to the Council. He writes that it is completed, but
not in a form that can be called permanent as he has lacked
the necessary funds. He writes frankly of the weakness of its
structure and explains that it is intended only to offer some
opposition to the enemy if they should try another raid such
as they made in 1677. Whether it conformed to the plan and
the specifications laid down for its construction except in the
single detail that its final exterior coat was of lime so that from
a little distance it should appear a building of stone, is not
now to be known. Hita Salazar characterized it as not permanent; how impermanent it was to be he probably never dreamed.
As for his careful instructions for its defense, he might as well
have spared himself the effort of writing them.
The Capture of the Fort
On the morning of the twentieth of March in the year 1682,
shortly after midnight, a pirate ship ran into the harbor of
San Marcos de Apalache and anchored near the harbor’s mouth.
The night was clear, and by the light of the moon the ship’s
lookout saw the white walls of what appeared to be a stone
fort and the black mouths of its gunports. From there the
fortification looked formidable and the pirate captain was about
to put back to sea when someone noticed the mast of a vessel
which was anchored further up the river. The pirate ship
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was out after prizes; this might be one. She put down three
pirogues, each with twenty-five armed men, and they rowed
against the current up the river. When they came near to
their object they saw that she was a small merchantman, a
bilander out of Havana, probably still loaded with the supplies
she had brought. She was anchored not more than a stone’s
throw from the fort and under the protection of its guns. If
they were to take her they would have to engage the fort
also. One boatload grappled to board her; the two others
disembarked, waded through marshgrass and water and attacked the fort.
What happened then can be known only as one can combine into a coherent whole the conflicting depositions taken
afterward by the governor from all and sundry. Juan Marques
Cabrera was a new man in the governor’s chair, having been
sent to fill it 6 contrary to political usage before Hita Salazar
was removed, a proceeding inexplicable unless made because
of the latter’s bad health. Cabrera was a forthright man and
above all a soldier, and he was shocked and indignant when
two enlisted men from Apalache brought to St. Augustine the
news that the fort had been taken by pirates without any attempt having been made to defend it. Here was an outrage
to the royal cause, a shameful disservice for which the guilty
must be identified and punished.
The commandant of the fort at that time was one, Lieutenant Pedro de los Arcos, reformado, one of those retired officers without command but still eligible for service, of whom
Spanish Florida seems to have had rather more than its share.
He was a creole, born in Pensacola, and he gave his age at
the time as “about sixty.” He may not even have known his
age with any certainty, and being a reformado have given
what may have been the usual retirement age among Spanish
6. Marques Cabrera came to Florida by way of Mexico from service in
Honduras.
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colonial troops. He was a professional soldier, and his name
appears in documents of the period. He had seen service in
Guale and had recently been transferred to Apalache where
he was charged with taking the census of mission villages and
their inhabitants. As commandant of the fort he was Hita Salazar’s appointee and may possibly have owed his position to
a certain piety which recommended him to the mission fathers
of Apalache with whom Hita Salazar was on good terms - the
last governor during many years thereafter to be so. On the
nineteenth of March 1682 he was in command in the fort of
San Marcos with - he says - four soldiers and an ensign under
him. The number appears incredibly small and the depositions taken afterward neither prove nor disprove the statement, but plainly the fort’s complement was extremely reduced.
On that day the ensign, Juan de Herrera, had been in charge
of the fort, the commandant having gone to San Luis 7 and returned late to resume his command and close the fort. Lodging
in the fort that night in addition to the commandant and his
five men were the captain of the bilander and three Franciscan
friars. Two of the friars were from one of the Apalachian missions and had come there to meet the third 8 who had just
arrived from Havana in the bilander. These four had elected
to spend the night in the fort in order to escape the mosquitoes,
though there was a bujio or lodging house of sorts and some
straw thatched huts outside of the walls. After nightfall Lieutenant Andres Perez, the officer in charge of the Province of
Apalache, accompanied by several enlisted men and an un7. San Luis (near the present Tallahassee,) was headquarters for the
Province of Apalache and an officer and a few soldiers were regularly
stationed there. It was, however, a mission station as well as a military
one, and the purpose for which Lieutenant de los Arcos had gone there
that day is mentioned in one of the depositions aS para cumplir, which
is to say, to attend religious services.
8. This third friar was the somewhat notorious Father Juan Angel who
in the next decade motivated if he did not actually initiate one of the
hottest quarrels between governor and Franciscans that ever came on
the Florida records.
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numbered band of Indians arrived, apparently with the intention likewise of spending the night within the shelter of the
fortification. The deponent who relates this says merely that the
fort being closed it was not opened to the officer and that he
lodged in the bujio or one of the huts. 9
About four o’clock in the morning the pre-dawn chill drove
the sentry on duty on the guard platform to go down and
warm himself at the kitchen fire. He left a substitute sentry
in his place, and this latter, scanning the river, saw dimly the
three pirogues, barely distinguishable in the breaking daylight.
Perplexed he went to call the sentry, and by the time the fort’s
occupants were awake and armed two boatloads of pirates
had come ashore and were attacking the fort. Questions shouted
to them in Spanish received no answers, but by this time the
thatched roofs of the huts were afire and the pirate captain
had realized that what he was attacking was not a stone fort
but a whitewashed log structure that could burn. He called for
grenades, in a language unintelligible to the Spanish creoles
but not to the captain of the bilander nor to the friars. The
captain shouted across the water to his crew that the French
were upon them, while the friars, quite beyond any discipline,
began to utter loud cries for quarter.
“Senor,” cried Father John Angel, stretching out his arms
to Ensign Herrera whom he apparently mistook for the commandant, “I want them to take me away and not kill me.”
Another friar was on the parapet imploring quarter until the
pirate leader shouted: “Go away, padre, let your captain speak
for all of you.” But the commandant was in the hands of Father
Leon who was telling him that he must open the gates, that
he no longer had any choice.
9. The fact that the fort was not opened to admit the lieutenant of the
province, nowhere explained, hints at strained relations between the
two men and was almost certainly taken as an insult by Perez who,
within hours, took an effective and ignoble revenge.
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“But padres,” protested de los Arcos, ”Take heed what you
do. We must die rather than surrender!”
Die? No, not they, nor perhaps anyone else in the fort,
though the few soldiers there were, seem to have done their
best. One gun broke, fell upon and injured the gunner. The
only other in position to be used, the one on the water-front
bastion, was fired, aimed at the bilander by order of its captain,
but missed or fell short, and then there was a shout for ammunition. The commandant went down to the magazine to
get it, and when he returned the gate was open and the pirates
were inside. Outside the walls Lieutenant Perez and his men
had departed, beating a retreat strategic perhaps but most inglorious. 10
The pirates made everyone prisoner and stripped the fort
of everything moveable from bronze guns down, arms, ammunition, supplies of all sorts including three hundred arrobas
of grain which had been stored in a granary outside the fort’s
walls. What they could not carry away they destroyed or
damaged so as to make it useless to the Spaniards. They put
ashore some of the prisoners they had made with orders to go
to San Luis and bring back ransom for the others, one of the
friars being sent to get it for his fellow religious. When after
several days no ransom for anyone came, the pirates sent a
letter which they had one of the friars write in which they
10. In spite of the unheroic conduct of the friars and the slightly rhetorical
reproof given them by the commandant, there would have been ample
justication for capitulation to the pirates. For those in the fort the
situation was hopeless and an honest surrender would have been no
disgrace. Unfortunately the matter was taken out of the commandant’s
hands before he could do anything, whatever he might have done.
The question of who opened the gate was never answered. In the
taking of depositions after the event the three Franciscans were not
questioned, doubtless because the religious were exempt from civil
and military interrogation except when permission was obtained from
their immediate superiors, and that permission Governor Cabrera
would have been the last man to ask or to obtain. A single soldier in
his deposition said that one of the friars opened the gate, but apparently his testimony carried no weight.
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threatened somewhat naively to come to San Luis in full force
and cut off everybody’s head unless the ransom was received at
once. In addition they demanded supplies which they claimed
they had always before been given. From the comparative
safety of San Luis Lieutenant Perez replied that he could not
furnish anything without the permission of his governor. As
for the friar who had been charged with getting ransom for
his fellow friars, he, like Noah’s last dove, returned no more.
The pirate ship hung around off the bar a matter of a fortnight, running into the river mouth from time to time at intervals which none of the deponents makes specific. Once the
raiders set fire to the ruined fort to destroy it more completely.
However, when it still appeared that no ransom for anyone
was or would be forthcoming, they released all their prisoners,
with the exception of Lieutenant de los Arcos and an unimportant
young soldier by the name of Hernandez, and departed. These
two they carried about the high seas with them for two months.
Then, on an occasion when they raided a couple of estates on
the Cuban coast, they released them there, apparently to make
room for three women captives they had just acquired and
whose lot in a buccaneer ship can be imagined. The released
prisoners made their way overland to Havana, and there, on
a hot June afternoon in that same year 1682, they appeared
before Governor Joseph de Cordoba y Ponce de Leon and declared themselves refugees from the raided and burned fort
of San Marcos de Apalache. The Governor listened to their
story and then called a scrivener to take their declarations. Not
that he was greatly interested in what had happened in Apalache. He had almost certainly heard about that before. But
this matter of pirates - well, he had his own troubles with that
lawless brotherhood. If this soldier who called himself Pedro
de los Arcos had spent two months of captivity in a buccaneer
vessel, surely he must have learned something about pirate
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doings and intentions in the Caribbean. But what Pedro de los
Arcos could tell was not much; only that the ship was one of
a fleet of ten or twelve raiders that lurked among the Florida
Keys and preyed on the shipping that rounded the Point and
went up the Florida coast or through the Bahama Channel;
only some confused gossip about buccaneer names and nicknames, and the rumor that the fleet was supposed shortly to
attack St. Augustine. 11 And when Hernandez’s deposition was
taken he gave almost word for word the same testimony the
older man had given.
The Treatment of Pedro de los Arcos
Governor de Cordoba sent the two back to Florida in the
next ship that cleared for St. Augustine since both had declared
themselves soldiers of that presidio. And Pedro de los Arcos
had scarcely set foot on Florida soil before he was arrested
by Governor Cabrera’s orders and lodged as a prisoner in the
still unfinished fortress. All that long, hot summer he languished there while the building of the castillo went on around
him, questioned and accused again and again, until his answers
were reduced to three weary statements which nothing could
make him change:
He had not opened the gate of San Marcos de Apalache
to the pirates.
He did not know who had opened the gate.
Lieutenant Perez was on the ground with troops and
could have given him aid and did not.
To Governor Cabrera the worn prisoner in the fortress was
always el confesante though he had confessed nothing, the man
of proven guilt though the confused and controvertible evidence
11. The rumor was true. Less than a year later corsairs (the record calls
them English but they may as well have been part of the Caribbean
pirate fleet of the French Huguenot leader du Casse, Henry Morgan’s
successor, since Caribbean buccaneers were too mixed a breed for
categorical classification) on March 30, 1683 invaded Florida and
marched on St. Augustine but were routed. See Manucy; The Building
of Castillo de San Marcos. (Washington, 1942.)
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given in San Luis did not prove it at all. Doubtless the governor
realized his own injustice, doubtless he knew that no just proof
or estimate of guilt could be arrived at without the sworn witness of the friars, and that sworn witness was out of his reach.
To his military mind the commandant of the fort was ex officio
the guilty man and must bear the blame and the punishment. 12
In the autos of the case 13 which went back to the Council
and the Crown we read as follows:
“In St. Augustine, on September 21, 1682, the Governor,
Juan Marques Cabrera, in view of the confession of Lieutenant
Pedro de los Arcos, commandant of infantry and of the Fort
of San Marcos [de Apalache] and his guilt as proved by all
the testimony as given in San Luis, condemns the said Pedro
de los Arcos to be banished, deprived of his rank and dishonored
for his punishment and as an example to all others.”
And four days later the following: “On the 25th of September, 1682, the [government] scrivener with the two paid
companies of the Presidio drawn up in squad formation with
their sergeant major and their captain, read the auto to Lieutenant Pedro de los Arcos in person, who, having understood
its tenor, obeyed, going away across the fields.”
We see the bowed figure growing ever smaller in the distance until it is lost in an obscurity out of which it was never
to emerge. For Pedro de los Arcos it was the end. What would
it have profited him had he known that the Council of the
Indies through its attorney-general, sternly rebuked Governor
Cabrera - its choice for carrying on the building of the castillo
and an executive of whom in the main it thought well - for
having dealt unjustly with a soldier of the Crown whose guilt
12. The case was in a manner a showdown between religious and civic
authorities, one in which the religious won the field by the simple
expedient of saying nothing where something needed to be said. It
was the beginning of actively strained relations between clergy and
governors which lasted more or less until the end of the First Spanish
Occupation.
13. Archives of the Indies 58-1-26 document 711. Translation mine.
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was neither confessed nor proved? His life lay in ruins, like
the charred and fallen timbers of the fort he had not been able
to defend.
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